{
  "id": "CVE-2026-114611",
  "url": "https://spydr.io/cve/CVE-2026-114611",
  "published": "2026-10-22T18:17:28.377Z",
  "modified": "2026-10-29T04:18:24.750Z",
  "score": 9.1,
  "severity": "critical",
  "cvss_version": "3.1",
  "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
  "score_source": "github.com",
  "epss": 0.00324,
  "epss_percentile": 0.26172,
  "exploited": false,
  "kev": null,
  "ssvc_exploitation": "poc",
  "vendors": [
    "schorschii"
  ],
  "products": [
    "schorschii OCO-Server"
  ],
  "cwes": [
    "CWE-295"
  ],
  "description": "OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue.",
  "status": "Deferred",
  "score_type": "Secondary",
  "scores": {
    "cvss_v40": null,
    "cvss_v31": 9.1,
    "cvss_v30": null
  },
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404",
      "tags": []
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df",
      "tags": []
    },
    {
      "url": "https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639",
      "tags": []
    }
  ],
  "nvd_url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114611",
  "covered_in": [],
  "attribution": [
    {
      "source": "NVD",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov",
      "notice": "This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD."
    },
    {
      "source": "CISA KEV",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog",
      "notice": "Known exploited vulnerabilities from the CISA KEV catalog."
    },
    {
      "source": "FIRST EPSS",
      "url": "https://www.first.org/epss",
      "notice": "Exploit prediction scores from FIRST EPSS."
    }
  ]
}
