{
  "id": "CVE-2026-98166",
  "url": "https://spydr.io/cve/CVE-2026-98166",
  "published": "2026-10-06T09:17:58.033Z",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T07:17:03.320Z",
  "score": 7.8,
  "severity": "high",
  "cvss_version": "3.1",
  "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
  "score_source": "CNA",
  "epss": 0.00198,
  "epss_percentile": 0.08684,
  "exploited": false,
  "kev": null,
  "ssvc_exploitation": null,
  "vendors": [
    "Linux"
  ],
  "products": [
    "Linux"
  ],
  "cwes": [],
  "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/ttm: fix swapped-out resources never leaving their bulk_move range ttm_tt_swapout() returns the number of pages swapped out on success and a negative error code on failure; for a populated ttm it never returns zero. Commit b2ed01e7ad3d (\"drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_swapout() infinite LRU walk on swapout failure\") moved the bulk_move bookkeeping in ttm_bo_swapout_cb() under \"if (!ret)\", so the ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() / ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() pair is now skipped on every successful swapout. The equivalent change for the shrinker in commit 1d59f36e95f7 (\"drm/ttm: Fix ttm_bo_shrink() infinite LRU walk on backup failure\") tests \"lret > 0\", which is what was intended here as well. Before b2ed01e7ad3d the resource was taken off the bulk_move before the swapout; since then a swapped-out resource stays inside its BO's bulk_move range (and on the manager LRU) although it is unevictable. When it is later freed or the BO leaves the bulk_move (ttm_resource_free(), ttm_bo_set_bulk_move() via amdgpu_vm_bo_del()), ttm_resource_del_bulk_move() skips it because of its !ttm_resource_unevictable() guard, so a range endpoint in pos->first / pos->last is left pointing at freed memory. The next ttm_lru_bulk_move_tail() or ttm_resource_add_bulk_move() on that cursor is a use-after-free, seen as the resv WARN in ttm_lru_bulk_move_add(), \"list_del corruption\" in ttm_resource_move_to_lru_tail() or a NULL dereference in ttm_resource_manager_next() -- minutes to hours after a hibernation, or at process exit / reboot following one. Samuel Ainsworth's analysis of drm/amd issue 5387 (see Link) identified the dangling cursor; the missing removal at swapout time is the reason it dangles. Testing the condition for success restores the removal. On an AMD Phoenix APU (ASUS UM3406GA, gfx1103) running suspend-then-hibernate on a 7.0.y stable kernel carrying the backport (Ubuntu 7.0.0-31) the bug crashed 5 of 18 hibernation cycles; a function profile of one hibernation showed 336 ttm_tt_swapout() calls and zero ttm_resource_del_bulk_move_unevictable() calls. With this change the removal happens for every swapped-out resource and 12 further cycles were clean.",
  "status": "Received",
  "score_type": "Secondary",
  "scores": {
    "cvss_v40": null,
    "cvss_v31": 7.8,
    "cvss_v30": null
  },
  "references": [
    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1169fe8c11ca45e3f91d59a73eb271d0ca8a7fb0",
      "tags": []
    },
    {
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3db7d7d583419f7b1f2e141e36418802dbb25cf8",
      "tags": []
    }
  ],
  "nvd_url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98166",
  "covered_in": [],
  "attribution": [
    {
      "source": "NVD",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov",
      "notice": "This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD."
    },
    {
      "source": "CISA KEV",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog",
      "notice": "Known exploited vulnerabilities from the CISA KEV catalog."
    },
    {
      "source": "FIRST EPSS",
      "url": "https://www.first.org/epss",
      "notice": "Exploit prediction scores from FIRST EPSS."
    }
  ]
}